Large-scale sell-offs of industrial timberlands in the United
In the northeastern United States from 1980 to 2005, an estimated 1.3% of industrial timberlands sold were purchased by conservation organizations, and less than 1% were purchased by public agencies (Hagan et al. 2005 ). Whether for development or preservation, conversion of forest lands into other uses reduces the land base available for timber production, which, in turn, affects local employment in forestry (Weinberg and Larson 2008) . Timberland sales frequently occur in rural areas already suffering long-term economic decline (Bliss et al. 2010 ). Proposals to convert commercial timberlands into new protected areas often face opposition due to concerns about jobs, taxes, and changes in recreational access. Thus, timberland sales have the potential to exacerbate existing social and economic problems and to fuel new conflicts over access to forest resources.
In this context, public agencies and private conservation organizations are becoming actively engaged in new forms of timberland ownership and management. A range of strategies has emerged that ostensibly integrate ecological and socioeconomic demands on forests, which we collectively refer to as working forests. These include large-scale conservation easements, certified sustainable forestry operations, and "conservation forestry" operations in which trees are harvested for a combination of ecological and economic reasons. These strategies raise a number of questions about the implications of harvesting trees for multiple objectives. In this article, we examine the potential of integrating ecological and socioeconomic monitoring to support management and policy related to these ambitious efforts.
A major shift in forest ownership is under way in the United
States. Since the 1980s, forest products companies sold millions of hectares (ha) of land in response to changes in US tax law, competition from globalized forest products markets, and increasing development values of forest land Sample 2001, Hagan et al. 2005) . From 2001 to 2007 alone, forest products companies sold over 11 million ha of timberland (Bliss et al. 2010) . The shift in ownership has introduced considerable uncertainty into future patterns of land use, with potentially significant consequences for forest ecosystems (Drummond and Loveland 2010) and the people who rely on them for recreation and income (Bliss et al. 2010) .
Financial investors-specifically, timberland investment management organizations (TIMOs) and real estate investment trusts (REITs)-have purchased the majority of these lands. The 10 largest private US timberland owners were industrial forest product companies in 1994; by 2006, 8 of the 10 were TIMOs or REITs (Bliss et al. 2010) . Whereas forest products companies typically maintained long-term ownerships in order to manage timber supply costs, investors have diverse financial goals and often expect to hold lands for only 10-15 years (Block and Sample 2001) . This can result in more intensive harvesting, fragmentation, or development of forest lands, which, in turn, can have negative impacts on ecosystem services provided by forests, such as wildlife habitat and carbon sequestration (Hagan et al. 2005, Likens and Franklin 2009) .
A small portion of former industrial timberlands have been purchased by public agencies or nonprofit conservation organizations and converted into parks or preserves. 
Forum
Working forests Shared concerns about the large-scale sell-off of industrially owned timberland among environmentalists, the wood products industry, and local communities have created opportunities for innovative collaborations. Public agencies, conservation groups, and private investors have begun investing in large-scale working-forest land deals, designed to prevent subdivision and development while promoting sustainable logging, recreation, or community development.
The term working forest is contested and holds different meanings for different actors. As Wolf and Klein (2007) demonstrated, commercial interests emphasize working forests as sources of employment and capital returns, and environmentalists emphasize the work performed by forests for the provision of ecosystem services. Therefore, the term can encompass a wide variety of management practices, ranging from intensive harvesting to relatively strict protection. Here, we use the term to refer to forests explicitly managed for a combination of environmental and socioeconomic objectives.
This new class of working-forest transactions involves novel distributions of property rights among multiple entities. In a number of instances, conservation organizations have purchased large tracts of industrial timberland, transferring ecologically valuable parcels to public agencies to be managed as protected areas and selling the remaining land to private investors engaged in timber production. For example, in 2006, The Nature Conservancy and the Conservation Fund purchased over 114,000 ha from International Paper (IP) in a set of transactions that totaled $375 million. These lands, which span 11 states, are currently being managed by over 20 agencies, private landowners, and private equity firms ). Management objectives include maintaining forest cover to protect water quality, restoring forest composition and structure, and conserving populations of federally listed species ).
Working-forest deals often stipulate that forests be managed according to sustainable forestry certification standards, such as those set by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC 1996) or the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI 2004) . These certification programs require that forest management practices meet specific ecological and socioeconomic criteria. For example, the FSC principles state that forest management "shall conserve biological diversity and its associated values, water resources, soils, and unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes" (FSC 1996, p. 6) and "maintain or enhance the long-term social and economic well-being of forest workers and local communities" (p. 5). As of March 2011, more than 135 million ha of forest land have been certified under FSC around the world (FSC 2011) .
Working-forest deals also often include conservation easements, which are legal agreements between a private landowner and a land trust or agency that restrict development but allow other uses, such as timber harvesting and recreation. For example, in 2002, the New England Forestry Foundation, a conservation organization, purchased a $28 million "working-forest conservation easement" on 300,000 ha of forest land in Maine owned by Pingree Associates, a private company (Sader et al. 2002) . The purpose of the Pingree easement is to maintain the property in a "primarily undeveloped condition as a working forest, and to conserve and/ or enhance forest and wildlife habitats, shoreline protection, and historic public recreation opportunities... for present and future generations" (Pingree Associates, Inc. 2001).
Conservation easements have become a common land protection practice in recent decades. In 2000, local and state land trusts in the United States made 60% of their investments in land conservation through easements (Fishburn et al. 2009 ). Beyond restricting development, working-forest conservation easements often commit the landowner to ensuring sustainable harvest practices, protecting wildlife habitat, and conserving water resources (Perschel 2006) . The new generation of working-forest conservation easements are notable for their large size; their political, financial, and legal complexity; and the breadth of the claims attached to them by proponents.
The promise of working forests: A win-win-win situation? Working-forest deals negotiated across the United States collectively encompass hundreds of thousands of hectares and represent hundreds of millions of dollars in investment (Ginn 2005 , Perschel 2006 ). These arrangements build on traditions such as sustainable forest management (Wang 2004 ) and multiple-use forestry (Bengston 1994) . The most recent transactions exhibit several novel elements, including sophisticated conservation finance strategies that link public and private funds and complex distributions of property rights that are focused on integrating multiple management objectives.
These transactions are also premised on explicit claims regarding the capacity of managed forests to produce environmental benefits, financial returns, local employment, and associated community development. They have therefore been hailed as "win-win-win" scenarios that simultaneously achieve environmental, social, and economic outcomes (Levitt 2003) . In a survey of 82 working-forest conservation easements, two-thirds featured management restrictions intended to protect ecosystems and rare species (Block et al. 2004) . Describing the Pingree easement, the governor of Maine, Angus King, said "the easement lands provide over 500 direct forest manufacturing jobs... Many families...will know their livelihood is secure because of this project" (Levitt 2003) . Working-forest transactions clearly provide environmental benefits by protecting forests from conversion to other uses. What is less clear is whether these deals deliver the range of ecological, social, and economic benefits advertised.
Working-forest transactions are based on a number of assumptions-for example, that maintaining forest cover will effectively conserve biodiversity ), that easements and forest certification provide durable protection (Gullison 2003 , Merenlender et al. 2004 , and that maintaining a flow of timber will ensure community sustainability , Charnley 2006 . Their performance is untested, however. The large areas demarcated by these deals, Forum the magnitude of the investment of public and private funds, and the substantial uncertainties that they encompass point to a need for critical assessment informed by empirical data.
Monitoring and working forests
Monitoring, or the systematic collection of data, is part of our daily lives: We use it to track changes in the weather, the price of fuel, or the performance of our favorite sports team (Lovett et al. 2007 ). Applied to conservation, monitoring is important for evaluating the condition of ecosystems and human communities, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of management interventions, and enhancing the legitimacy of decisions (Stem et al. 2005 , Tear et al. 2005 , Bormann et al. 2007 ). Nonetheless, there continue to be challenges to investment in environmental monitoring, highlighted by recent reductions in funding for long-term programs (Lovett et al. 2007) . In this context, claims that conservation projects are succeeding are suspect (Bernhardt et al. 2005, Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006) .
Promises about the benefits of working forests appear to be no different. Although monitoring is critical for evaluating the investment of public funds (Perschel 2006) , demonstrating compliance with legal or voluntary management standards (Hickey et al. 2005 ) and building trust among stakeholders (Block et al. 2004) , it is generally not prioritized in workingforest deals (Block et al. 2004 , Mortimer et al. 2007 ). Monitoring of working forests faces additional challenges related to the large areas encompassed by these properties (often distributed over multiple parcels), the long time scales over which forests change, and complex ecological and socioeconomic dynamics that make it difficult to distinguish the effects of management from other factors. Added to this are the fragmented ownership structures of these deals, which include multiple institutions with diverse objectives.
Although there is broad agreement on the importance of monitoring (e.g., Parrish et al. 2003, Likens and Franklin 2009) , little is known about the practice of monitoring in the working-forest context. For this analysis, we reviewed published and unpublished studies of monitoring of working forests and interviewed monitoring experts. Our intention was to derive lessons from relevant experience, highlight innovative approaches, and offer guidance to future efforts to assess ecological and socioeconomic dimensions of this new approach to forest management.
Gaps in working-forest evaluation
Our first finding is that the literature on working-forest monitoring is scarce. We were able to identify a total of eight published and unpublished studies that provided sufficient details on monitoring methods, indicators, and results to support our analysis of current monitoring practice (table 1) . These studies were identified through a combination of direct experience, interviews, and a literature search. Three of the authors (RAN, RCS, and THT) have been involved in forest-monitoring initiatives conducted by The Nature Conservancy and the Canadian Forest Service. We also conducted semistructured interviews with four researchers engaged in forest-monitoring programs at the US Department of Agriculture Forest Service, the Canadian Forest Service, The Nature Conservancy, and the University of Maine. The interviews were focused on the integration of ecological and socioeconomic indicators, program costs, challenges facing monitoring programs, and how the resulting data were used to inform management or policy.
In This resulted in 186 articles from a variety of disciplines. The vast majority of the articles were not useful for our analysis, because they described hypothetical monitoring frameworks rather than existing programs or one-time assessments rather than iterative monitoring programs or because they were focused on small geographic areas or addressed only biophysical indicators, such as soils. 
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In only eight studies was actual iterative monitoring of working forests at relevant geographic scales (100,000 ha or larger) described. In these studies, diverse geographies across the United States, Canada, and Europe were analyzed, and the monitoring of a range of types and sizes of working forests was addressed. The dearth of examples indicates either that few monitoring programs exist or that such programs exist but are not being documented. Either way, the lack of data limits our ability to draw conclusions about the performance of working forests but highlights the importance of the information we did find. In particular, similarities in monitoring approaches and indicators were apparent from this small group of studies.
Monitoring forest management
The stated goals for working forests described in these studies often included the protection of water resources, rare species, or other ecological features, but the corresponding indicators were often underemphasized or excluded from monitoring. The existing monitoring programs tended to focus on indicators related to forest cover and management activities. In a survey of the monitoring of 45 working-forest conservation easements in the United States (Block et al. 2004) , easement restrictions related to development, roads, and forest-management activities such as the occurrence of clearcuts were monitored frequently. Easement goals such as providing wildlife habitat, maintaining water quality, and protecting biodiversity were monitored less often. As one monitoring professional reported, "I guess the easiest thing[s] to monitor… are forest management activities, because they are visible" (Block et al. 2004, p. 261) .
The monitoring of certified forestry operations in the studies also emphasized forest-management activities. In a review of 22 certified forests in North America and Europe, indicators related to timber harvesting practices, roads, and wildlife management were frequently monitored, but indicators related to water quality and forest health were monitored less often (Hickey et al. 2005) . Where ecological monitoring was conducted, the focus was primarily on terrestrial ecosystems. In a study of 174 "conservation forestry" properties owned or managed by The Nature Conservancy, watershed protection was a stated goal for 141 of the properties (81%), but freshwater systems were reportedly monitored on only 11 (6%) (Jeanette Howard, The Nature Conservancy, San Francisco, personal communication, 26 May 2009). In comparison, terrestrial ecosystems were reportedly monitored on 80 out of 174 properties (46%), and 45 of the properties (26%) had plans to monitor forestry practices.
Monitoring programs developed for the Pingree conservation easement and The Nature Conservancy's IP land acquisition, described above, were also focused on forest cover and management activities (Sader et al. 2002 ). Both programs emphasized indicators related to forest fragmentation, harvest activities, and the development of roads and buildings. Such programs assume that maintaining forest cover conserves biodiversity )-an important assumption that may be flawed.
The use of easements and certification represent opportunities to gather, analyze, and use data to inform subsequent management decisions. Certification audits and easement compliance monitoring ensure that at least a minimum set of indicators is tracked and that the resulting data are incorporated in subsequent management decisions. Despite formal requirements to do so, not all easement holders have the capacity to conduct monitoring. Shortfalls in forest inventories, record keeping, and management plans were reported in a study of US working-forest conservation easements (Mortimer et al. 2007 ). Mortimer and colleagues (2007) concluded that "failure to address these shortcomings runs the risk of jeopardizing the legitimacy of the easement approach" (p. 35).
For those indicators that were monitored, multiscale methods were considered to be most effective. For working-forest conservation easements, monitoring effectiveness was defined as the ability of the monitoring entity to detect easement violations (Block et al. 2004) . Using this definition, ground-level monitoring (i.e., site visits) was considered least effective when it was used alone but more effective when it was combined with remote sensing (i.e., satellite imagery) or annual meetings between the landowner and the easement holder.
Monitoring based on remotely sensed data is useful for monitoring large areas and can be performed for a fraction of the cost of ground-based sampling (Wiens et al. 2009 ). Both the Pingree and the IP monitoring programs relied on satellite imagery to detect large-scale changes in forest cover. For example, forest-cover reductions due to thinning and clearcuts were detected on IP lands that were sold to private owners without conservation restrictions ). Remote-sensing methods were considered more effective when linked to site visits or meetings with forest managers in order to correctly interpret and act on detected changes. Localized changes were tracked in the Pingree program through the use of aerial photography and site visits. The IP program included a survey of forest managers to evaluate management activities that were difficult to assess remotely. Thus, a combination of geographically extensive and intensive sampling approaches was recommended for monitoring working forests (Sader et al. 2002 , Block et al. 2004 .
Even for relatively well-developed monitoring programs, funding for monitoring represented a tiny portion of overall program costs. The Nature Conservancy invested approximately $500,000 over five years in the IP monitoring program ). Although this is a substantial sum, it represented approximately 0.1% of the cost of the land acquisition. The Pingree easement monitoring program was somewhat better supported through a permanent $1 million endowment established by the New England Forestry Foundation (Levitt 2003) . This represents approximately 3% of the cost of the easement. Nonetheless, these two programs are unusual; investing in performance evaluation appears not to be a high priority in most working-forest land deals, since staff and donors generally prefer allocating resources to new acquisitions (Block et al. 2004 ). This issue is not restricted to forests; despite billions of dollars invested in river restoration efforts in Forum the United States since 1990, Bernhardt and colleagues (2005) found that few were monitored for effectiveness.
Socioeconomic monitoring
Working-forest land deals are designed in order to address multiple dimensions of forest management; this is often touted as the strength of these arrangements. Surprisingly, we were unable to identify any examples of integrated ecological and socioeconomic monitoring of working-forest conservation easements, certified forests, or conservation forests. In the eight studies that we found, monitoring of certified forests rarely included socioeconomic indicators (Hickey et al. 2005) , even though forest certification schemes explicitly address effects of management on human well-being.
The only integrated monitoring programs that we identified were associated with major governmental policy initiatives such as the Northwest Forest Plan in the United States, which includes portions of three states (e.g., Charnley 2006 , Bormann et al. 2007 , and the Model Forest Network in Canada, which includes 14 forested regions across the country (e.g., Parkins et al. 2001 , den Otter and Beckley 2002 . The Pacific Northwest Interagency Regional Monitoring Program included monitoring of two threatened species, the northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet, as well as of old-growth forests, watersheds, and socioeconomic impacts of the plan. Monitoring of the Canadian Model Forest Network differed among regions, but several model forests included monitoring of biological indicators as well as socioeconomic indicators in local communities. Although they were significantly larger in scale than the working-forest land deals that are the focus of this study, these two programs provided some useful insights into the costs and challenges associated with integrated monitoring.
Investments in ecological and socioeconomic monitoring programs were not equivalent. For the Foothills Model Forest in Alberta, an estimated $50,000-$75,000 per year was spent on monitoring, but only a small proportion ($6,000-$8,000) supported socioeconomic monitoring. The Northwest Forest Plan monitoring program received the most funding of all of the studies we reviewed; a total of $50.2 million was allocated to monitoring in the first 10 years (Charnley 2008) . Although the approximately $1.6 million allocated to socioeconomic monitoring was substantial, it amounted to a small portion (approximately 3%) of the total monitoring budget and was dramatically reduced to $265,000 for the subsequent fiveyear period. Limited resources allocated to monitoring in general and an absence of legal obligations to monitor socioeconomic indicators in particular likely explain the asymmetrical investment in monitoring (Charnley 2008) .
Efforts to integrate socioeconomic and ecological monitoring in these projects faced considerable challenges. The geographic scales at which forest management takes place, such as ownership boundaries or management units, rarely align with sociopolitical boundaries, such as communities, counties, or states (Charnley 2008) . It is also difficult to isolate the effects of forest management on socioeconomic indicators from other factors such as trends in forest products markets and the national or global economy. Consequently, causality is often unclear (Stedman et al. 2004 ). For example, linking changes in socioeconomic indicators to the enactment of the Northwest Forest Plan was difficult because of mediating variables such as the strength of the timber sector. Stedman and colleagues (2004) concluded that the assumed relationship between stable levels of timber harvest and community stability was flawed. An improved understanding of the socioeconomic impacts of forest management will require data collection efforts that are focused on the causal relationships between forest land use and human well-being.
Multiscale approaches were considered most effective for socioeconomic monitoring in several of the studies (den Otter and Beckley 2002 , Charnley 2006 . Both the Northwest Forest Plan and the Canadian Model Forest Network monitoring program combined censusbased indicators such as employment and income levels, demographic trends, and property values with interviews and surveys of community members about their selfreported well-being (Parkins et al. 2001 , Charnley 2006 ). Assessments of well-being that required primary data collection were more expensive than relying on secondary (i.e., census) data alone but improved the validity of the results. For example, census data indicated low levels of well-being in Newfoundland communities, but the residents reported comparatively high well-being due to strong place attachment, social support, and unreported supplemental income (den Otter and Beckley 2002) .
Even if monitoring was conducted, the resulting information was not necessarily applied to management or policy. For example, it is not clear how the results of the IP monitoring program will be incorporated into future management, since the program lasted only three years and the lands are now owned by a multitude of public and private entities. Even the results from large government monitoring programs were not consistently incorporated in subsequent policy decisions. Despite legal mandates to monitor the ecological and socioeconomic impacts of the Northwest Forest Plan, efforts to incorporate monitoring data into decisionmaking met with mixed success because of a lack of agency capacity (Charnley 2006 ) and a lack of flexibility in management options (Bormann et al. 2007 ).
Integrated monitoring
Although there is extensive guidance for designing monitoring programs (e.g., Margoluis and Salafsky 1998 , Stem et al. 2005 , Salzer and Salafsky 2006 , there is a need for interdisciplinary, practical concepts and tools to support monitoring of this new generation of land deals. Efforts to define ecological and socioeconomic criteria for sustainable forest management, such as the Montréal Process Criteria and Indicators (Montréal Process Working Group 2007) , can serve as a starting point but will need refinement. For example, predictions about the impacts of management on ecosystems and human communities should be made explicit and tested empirically.
Forum ecosystems and people. The lack of monitoring is not unique to working forests; results of approved practices are often not monitored, despite a lack of evidence that such practices achieve desired outcomes (Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006) .
We recognize the financial realities that constrain monitoring efforts. There is a need to incorporate monitoring costs into project budgets from the start and to employ existing tools such as conservation easements and forest certification that feature formal data collection requirements. We recommend allocating a portion of the funds invested in land and easement acquisition to strategic monitoring. Given the magnitude of the financial resources involved in many of these deals, even a modest allocation of 1% to 5% of funds would greatly enhance our capacity to evaluate the success of past investments and would improve the effectiveness of future investments.
We are not advocating a "measure everything" approach. Strategic monitoring priorities should be developed on the basis of the level of uncertainty about the effects of management and the perceived level of risk to species, ecosystems, and human communities (e.g., Salzer and Salafsky 2006) . The spatial and temporal scales at which data are collected need to strike a balance between fiscal pragmatism and the complexities of the systems studied. Indicators should also be linked to specific management objectives that collectively define how broader societal goals will be achieved (Tear et al. 2005) .
Periodic, repeated assessments of key ecological or socioeconomic variables can be a cost-effective way to track longer-term changes. For example, monitoring of socioeconomic indicators could be conducted every 5 or 10 years, concurrent with census cycles. Similarly, species inventories or other biological sampling could be conducted on a 5-or a 10-year cycle, to measure longer-term ecological impacts of management activities. Periodic data collection could be conducted instead of, or as a complement to, more frequent or intensive sampling efforts.
We recognize that monitoring in and of itself does not lead to improved management; however, a lack of empirical data increases the risk that these ambitious strategies will fail to achieve long-term goals. With a relatively modest investment, we believe it would be possible to advance understanding of the effectiveness of these large, expensive experiments in conservation and sustainable forest management and, ultimately, to contribute to the socioecological integrity of forested landscapes.
Over time, quantitative and qualitative approaches to monitoring can help validate or reframe the expected causal relationships between management decisions and desired outcomes.
We collected examples of monitoring approaches and indicators from existing monitoring programs (table 2) . These include geographically extensive approaches such as remote sensing, intermediate approaches such as aerial photography, and intensive approaches such as field sampling. They also include examples of ecological, socioeconomic, and forest management-related indicators. These suggestions serve as an entry point to designing an integrated monitoring program that explicitly addresses the multiple objectives articulated in many working-forest arrangements.
Conclusions
Working-forest land deals and related strategies to integrate conservation and resource management are considered progressive forms of land use, but these approaches raise many questions about the viability of such complex arrangements. As working-forest transactions have grown to encompass ever-larger geographic areas and greater financial investments, the sophistication of monitoring must keep pace. These land deals currently represent an untested hypothesis about the ability of forested landscapes to meet contemporary ecological and socioeconomic demands. Without robust empirical data, policymakers, investors, and the public will be unable to validate claims regarding the performance of working forests, to enhance the effectiveness of future investments, or to ultimately evaluate the success of the working-forest approach.
Our primary finding is that there is currently insufficient evidence to evaluate the success or failure of working forests. Existing projects often lack even a framework for gathering necessary information. For this analysis, we relied on a disappointingly sparse set of studies of working forests of different types and sizes and from different biological, social, and political settings. Where data were collected, they were inconsistently documented and incorporated in management or policy. We also observed a lack of alignment between the objectives for working forests and the indicators being tracked. This severely limited our ability to draw general conclusions about the working-forest model. This is troublesome because financial support and political support for working forests are based on explicit claims regarding their multiple benefits for 
